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Articles
Expansionary Possibilities for Affiliated
Commercial Banks: A Current Dilemma
S.P. DEVOLDER*
In Investment Company Institute v. Camp,' the United States
Supreme Court stated that Congress enacted the Glass-Steagall Bank-
ing Act of 19332 for two primary purposes: (1) to protect against the
financial risk inherent when banks engage in speculative securities in-
vestments; and (2) to guard against "subtle hazards" that appear when
banks act not in their capacity of managing agent for their clientele's
accounts but as buyer and seller of investment securities.3 Congress,
therefore, intended to achieve the plenary separation of the business
of commercial banking from the business of investment banking.'
While Congress, with assistance from the courts, 5 was severing the
* B.A., B.S. 1981, Iowa State University; J.D., 1984, The University of Iowa. The author
wishes to express his thanks to W. H. Knight, University of Iowa Professor of Law, for his
extensive critique of the article's first draft. The author also thanks Gary S. Gill, J.D. 1985,
for his helpful comments.
1. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
2. 12 U.S.C. §§78, 324, 377, 378 (1982).
3. 401 U.S. at 630.
4. See 12 U.S.C. §§78, 324, 377, 378.
5. See, e.g., New York Stock Exchange v. Bloom, 562 F.2d 736, 737 (D.C. Cir.
1977) ("[s]ections 16 and 21 of Glass-Steagall impose strict limitations on the authority of banks
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ties of investment and commercial banking, an almost simultaneous
severance was occurring in another banking field as well: the differen-
tiation of commercial banking from other related financial institutions.6
In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,' the Supreme Court
held that section 7 of the Clayton Act8 applied to bank mergers and
acquisitions. 9 Moreover, in delineating the critical "line-of-commerce"
market'0 as required under section 7, the Court drew a compact boun-
dary line encompassing "commercial banking."" The ramifications
of the draftsmanship were profound for two reasons.
First, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA)I2 defines
a "bank" as any institution that accepts demand deposits and makes
commercial loans. 3 These operations represent the two necessary con-
ditions of commercial banking. 4 The analysis by the Philadelphia
National Court seemed to imply, therefore, that banks governed under
the BHCA would be regulated by section 7 of the Clayton Act for
antitrust purposes.
Second, given the restrictive definition by the Philadelphia National
Court of the line-of-commerce market in bank merger cases, challenges
to bank holding company mergers and acquisitions stood a good
chance to succeed under antitrust analysis. Success was promised
because competition from noncommercial bank depository institutions,
such as thrifts, would not be considered in the determination of actual
competition in the commercial banking market.' 5
to purchase, sell, issue, underwrite, distribute, or otherwise deal in stocks and securities");
Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 516 F.2d 1206, 1211 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
6. What might be labelled as "related" to a commercial bank presents a difficult deter-
mination of pedigree. This difficulty arises because the regulatory authorities have an amorphous
definition of a "bank." See infra note 49 and accompanying text. For the purposes of this
essay, "related financial institutions" are those predominately depository-type financial con-
cerns. Operationally, savings and loans, for instance, are included within the ambit of this
definition. Excluded thereby would be financial concerns such as Merrill Lynch, which although
offering services of a suspiciously depository nature (e.g., CMA's), nevertheless are predominately
nondepository.
7. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
8. 15 U.S.C. §18. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, provides in pertinent part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole
or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part
of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line
of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly.
9. 374 U.S. at 343-49.
10. See supra note 8.
11. 374 U.S. at 356.
12. As codified in 12 U.S.C. §§1841-1849.
13. 12 U.S.C. §184f(a)(6)(c).
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 660-66 (1974).
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In effect, the apparent result of this two-prong separation attack
was that banks were barred from participating vigorously in the
securities field by the proscriptions of the Glass-Steagall Act as inter-
preted by the judiciary in decisions such as Camp. Moreover,
commercial banks found themselves barred from merging and under-
taking new acquisitions in seemingly competitive markets because of
the restrictive antitrust analysis by the judiciary, as exemplified in
Philadelphia National.
Appearances, however, can be deceiving. The question remains
whether Philadelphia National is the exception to the rule. Although
the BHCA included "affiliated" commercial banks to the Philadelphia
National antitrust analysis because of the definition of a "bank,"
the Act concomitantly has unleashed such banks from the purported
restrictions of the Glass-Steagall Act. This has resulted in a change
in the earlier trend in securities law of absolute separation between
investment and commercial banking. On the other hand, the antitrust
trend created by Philadelphia National, of restricting competition be-
tween commercial banks and other functionally related financial
institutions, has remained on its original path.' 6
With these two present trends in mind, this article proposes to detail
the historical development of the Glass-Steagall and Bank Holding
Company Acts, and to address the question whether changed condi-
tions and new institutional outlooks demand that like changes occur
in current agency and judicial analyses. Moreover, this article will
demonstrate that the current judicial trend of fusing commercial and
investment banking threatens to cause another financial upheaval, and
that the current trend in the bank holding company merger and
acquisition field, unlike the trend in the investment area, is one of
separation.
This article will focus on the problems raised from the perspective
of the national commercial bank, particularly from the perspective
of the bank holding company and its affiliated national commercial
banks.' 7 Consequently, the arguments of overseeing investment banks
and other noncommercial bank financial institutions, calling for even
greater encroachment into the prerogatives of the commercial banker,
are beyond the scope of this article. State banking restrictions that
16. See, e.g., United States v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 120 (1975); United States
v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 667 (1974); United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank,
399 U.S. 350, 359 (1970); United States v. Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville, 390 U.S. 171, 182-83
(1968).
17. The principal reason for this is that a large majority of the demand deposits held
by commercial banks are held by commercial banks affiliated to a holding company.
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are of only marginal relevance to national banking also will not be
discussed.' 8 With these limitations in mind, the discussion will begin
with an overview of the historical development of the Glass-Steagall
and Bank Holding Company Acts.
TnE SEcURiTIEs FIELD: AN INSECURE OPPORTUNITY
The Glass-Steagall Act was enacted to eliminate the possibility of
history repeating itself. In this sense, the Act exemplifies other major
legislation dealing with the business of banking in this country. In
other words, the Act was a reaction to a crisis and was not a
prophylactic piece of legislation promulgated to protect against an
unwanted progeny. The crisis, in this case, was the Great Depression
of the 1930s.
This section will examine the Glass-Steagall Act. A brief descrip-
tion of the crisis that gave rise to the need for the Act initially will
be given. Arguments then will be suggested that historical conditions
have changed to such an extent that the Act has outlived any
usefulness. Next, with this consideration in mind, the Bank Holding
Company Act will be examined, with emphasis placed on controver-
sial language that permits bank holding company expansion into non-
banking areas. The author next will analyze specifically how this per-
missive statutory recipe has served to succor bank holding companies
during their periods of incursion into the securities and investments
camp. The article will continue with an argument on the very probable
prospects that these incursions represent merely the prelude to an im-
minent full-scale invasion. Finally, this section of the article will sug-
gest the problems this invasion might create for the expanding bank
holding companies themselves.
A. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933
Sections 16, 20, 21, and 32, as amended, of the National Banking
Act of 1933,1" commonly referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act, are
relatively straightforward. Section 1620 grants to national banking
associations all such incidental powers, subject to law, necessary to
18. For instance, the Douglas and McFadden Amendments, which incorporate state
branching restrictions to nationally chartered banks, makes such state law relevant to federal
banking issues. See 12 U.S.C. §§36, 1842(d). Thus, state branching restrictions properly will
be emphasized in the article, unlike, for instance, state chartering requirements.
19. 12 U.S.C. §§24(7), 377, 378, and 78.
20. 12 U.S.C. §24(7).
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carry on the business of banking.2' This broad grant of power,
however, is tempered by the significant limitation that national bank-
ing associations are relegated to an agency role when dealing in
securities.22 Banks that handle securities, therefore, are restricted to
purchasing and selling securities solely upon the order and account
of their third-party customer. In addition, the transaction must be
without recourse.23 Banks can purchase and sell securities for their
own accounts only in limited circumstances.2" Banks explicitly are pro-
hibited from actually underwriting an issue. Moreover, section 20 pro-
scribes affiliation mechanisms to defeat the mandates of section 16.25
Section 32 prevents the interlocking directorate alternative. 6 Finally,
section 2127 prohibits securities dealers from engaging in the business
of commercial banking or accepting demand deposits. The legislative
history and purposes of the Act must be examined to understand the
rationale underlying the restrictions promulgated in these sections.
1. Legislative History and Purpose
Prior to 1900, national banks were regulated by the National Bank
Act of 1864.28 The Act empowered national banks to engage solely
in the banking business, which included the power to discount notes
and otherwise negotiate "evidences of debt."' 29 Although not considered
as broad a grant of authority to engage in the investment securities
practice as was undertaken by many state chartered banks at the time,3"
nationally chartered banks nevertheless became involved in the pur-
chase and sale of stocks and bonds both for their own account and
for the accounts of their customers.3' Prohibited from actually under-
writing or trading in corporate stocks,32 national banks, sometimes
21. Id. Along with "incidental powers," arguably a separate grant of power, the provi-
sion includes five specified banking powers as well: discounting, deposit receiving, circulating




25. 12 U.S.C. §377.
26. 12 U.S.C. §78.
27. 12 U.S.C. §378.
28. Ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
29. National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, §8, 13 Stat. 99, 101 (1864) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§24(7)).
30. New Jersey, for example, permitted banks to engage in a full-range of securities activities,
subject to prohibitions against "speculating." See Clucas v. Bank of Montclair, 110 N.J.L.
394, 166 A. 311, 313 (1933).
31. See Note, National Banks and the Brokerage Business: The Comptroller's New Reading
of the Glass-Steagall Act, 69 VA. L. REv. 1303, 1306-13 (1983).
32. See, e.g., California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U.S. 362, 367 (1897).
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directly but usually through the operation of their affiliates, were left
fairly free from federal regulation to conduct a full range of stock
and bond trading activities.
After the bottom fell out of the securities market in 1929, the
previous freedom banks enjoyed in cultivating the securities market
came to an end. When the Bank of the United States failed in 1930,
Congress was quick to point the finger of blame at the speculative
activities of the numerous securities affiliates in the banking industry."
Many members of Congress believed that commercial banks had fueled
the rampant speculation that led to the dramatic decline of the stock
market. Fuel to increase the speculative fever was supplied by banks
both in the direct form of trading in speculative issues for their own
accounts and in the indirect form of unwisely providing generous
margin loans for their customers' stock schemes. 3 With thousands
of banks closing 35 and the term "public confidence" battered about
as a cruel joke, the historical climate was ripe3 6 for strong corrective
medicine. The prescription by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
and Congress was the National Bank Act of 1933,11 relevant sections
of which became known popularly as the Glass-Steagall Act.
The broad purpose of the Glass-Steagall Act was to protect customer
deposits from a repetition of the widespread bank closings of the Great
Depression.38 The Act was to achieve this substantive end principally
by the creation of federal deposit insurance,39 which was to increase
depositor confidence in the overall banking system. Congress sought
to provide still further protection for depositors by annulling the ill-
fated commercial and investment banking elopement. Clearly, section
16 of the Act prohibits a commercial bank from underwriting or deal-
ing in a security issue. What other activities might be perceived as
arguably related to investment banking operations was not immediately
clear, however. " Thus, the courts were left to determine the intent
of Congress in drafting and adopting Glass-Steagall. In Investment
33. Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 71 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 116-17, 1068.
34. See S. RP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 8, 10.
35. By 1933, nearly 9,000 banks had failed. Clark & Sanders, Judicial Interpretation of
Glass-Steagall: The Need for Legislative Actions, 97 BANKiNG L.J. 721, 723 (1980).
36. See Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History, 88 BANK-
ING L.J. 483 (1971); 2 F. Redlich, Tm MoLiaNG OF AmRICAN BANKiNG 1-85 (1968).
37. See supra note 19.
38. 77 CONG. REc. 3837 (1933).
39. 48 Stat. 168-80 (1933).
40. See Note, A Banker's Adventures in Brokerland: Looking Through Glass-Steagall at
Discount Brokerage Services, 81 MicK. L. REV. 1498, 1511-27 (1983).
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Company Institute v. Camp4 the Supreme Court approached this issue
by inquiring into the particular risks and abuses Congress desired to
eliminate when separating commercial from investment banking. "2
The Court held in Camp that the Comptroller of the Currency (the
Comptroller) lacked the authority to authorize commercial banks to
operate collective investment funds in direct competition with the
mutual fund industry. An opposite result, reasoned the Court, would
permit commercial banks to deal and underwrite securities issues in
direct violation of sections 16 and 21 of the National Bank Act of
1933.11 The Court read the underlying purpose of the statute as
precluding commercial banks from involvement in the investment bank-
ing business. Any potential anticompetitive effects that might result
from such an interpretation of the Act were more than "outweighed
by the 'hazards' and 'financial dangers' that arise when commercial
banks engage in the activities proscribed by the Act." '4
The Court noted that Congress also had more than just the intent
to ensure that commercial bankers acted solely as the fiduciary or
managing agents of their customers' accounts. The Court in Camp
listed the following:
[Congress also] had in mind and repeatedly focused on the more
subtle hazards that arise when a commercial bank goes beyond the
business of acting as fiduciary or managing agent and enters the
investment banking business either directly or by establishing an
affiliate to hold and sell particular investments. This course places
new promotional and other pressures on the bank which in turn
create new temptations.4 5
The results would be as follows: (1) unsound loans would be made
to invigorate a troubled security affiliate leading to the risk of bank
instability; (2) banking reputation would be undermined by the results
of such unsound practices; (3) the public would lose confidence in
the overall banking system; (4) risky margin loans would be made
to customers; (5) promotional campaigns would be launched to adver-
tise the specific investments of the bank at the expense of its role
as the disinterested investment advisor; and (6) self-dealing would be
encouraged.46
Pressure to make unsound loans to affiliates would arise because
41. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
42. Id. at 630-38.
43. Id. at 639.
44. Id. at 630.
45. Id. at 630-31.
46. Id. at 631-38.
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of the close association by the public between the bank and the
troubled affiliate.47 Moreover, any investment and depository losses
that the public might suffer because of investment losses by a bank
would undermine confidence in the national banking system, leading
to a potential repeat of the disastrous Depression era bank runs, which,
the Court feared, might recur during a period of a prolonged bear
market. " Finally, any bank that operated a securities department would
have particular investments to sell. Such a bank, in acting as a security
vendor rather than merely offering disinterested advice, obviously
would be subjected to pressures forcing it to finance potential
customers investments in its own offerings. These pressures could serve
to corrupt the pure investment advice supposedly offered by the bank
acting solely as a fiduciary or agent.49
2. Changing Historical Conditions
Some commentators argue that the considerations that motivated
Congress in 1933 to separate investment and commercial banking are
no longer relevant today."0 If so, those blatant and subtle hazards
that the Camp Court elucidated in 1971 are out of place in the evolv-
ing financial markets of the 1980s. The champions of this view, in
order to bolster their assertions, point to the comparatively liberal
recent policies of the Comptroller and the Federal Reserve Board (the
Board). -Indeed, they claim that the Court of the 1980s has adopted
this view, citing as support the 1984 case of Securities Industry Associa-
tion v. Board of Governors (SIA 11).12
These prognostications by the proponents for the integration of
investment and commercial banking appear to be amassing current
evidentiary support. In this regard, the predictions of the prog-
nosticators cannot be ignored by those who wish to stay at the
vanguard of the banking field. True, bank holding companies have
made great inroads into the securities field, predominantly through
section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 195613 and
47. Id. at 631; see also 1931 Hearings at 1064.
48. 401 U.S. at 631.
49. Id. at 636-38; see also 75 CONG. REc. 9912 (1932) (comments of Sen. Buckley on
the loss of public confidence in banks caused by questionable investment counselling).
50. See supra note 35.
51. See infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
52. 104 S. Ct. 3003 (1984) (held Board had authority to permit a bank holding company
to acquire a nonbanking corporation engaged solely in the retail securities brokerage business,
despite the fact that the acquisition would not facilitate any banking operations of the holding
company).
53. 12 U.S.C. §1843(c)(8).
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"Regulation Y,,,14 a regulation promulgated by the Board under
authority granted under the Act. For example, pursuant to this regula-
tion, a bank holding company may manage a closed-end investment
company. Moreover, the company can provide both general economic
forecasts and specific portfolio advice to any interested person. 5 Thus,
before a more in-depth analysis of the current expansionary
phenomenon by commercial banks into the investment banking field
can be undertaken cogently, a preliminary analysis of section 4(c)(8)
of the 1956 statute, and of the regulation that it spawned, must be
made.
B. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA), similar to its
1933 predecessor, appears straightforward and simple.56 A bank holding
company is a company that controls a bank." "Company" includes
almost any organizational structure that reasonably can come to mind,
with the exception of individuals and individuals acting in concert."
A "bank" is a domestic institution that receives demand deposits and
makes commercial loans. 9 Finally, "control" over a bank is found
to exist if: (1) a bank holding company has direct or indirect control
over one-quarter or more of the bank voting shares or the voting
rights over them; (2) the holding company controls the election of
a majority of the bank directorate; or (3) the Board determines that
the company directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence
over the actual management or policies of the bank.60
The substantive provision of the statute, by which we will attempt
to answer our inquiry on affiliated commercial bank expansion into
the securities field, is section 4(c)(8). Section 4(c)(8) permits bank
54. 12 C.F.R. §225.
55. See infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
56. The 1956 Act, unfortunately, is analogous to its predecessor in another respect as well.
The countenance of facial simplicity disguises the souls of these creatures, souls that are complex
and cold. A bank holding company, for instance, is any company that controls a bank. See
supra note 50 and accompanying text. Something obviously is amiss when a definer uses the
very term of the object being defined (bank) in the body of the definition in order to describe
the necessary conditions of that object. This is a circular analysis.
57. 12 U.S.C. §1841(a)(1). Also, for a superb study of the intricacies of bank holding
company law, see P. HELLER, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAW (1976).
58. 12 U.S.C. §1841(b).
59. 12 U.S.C. §1841(c). Demand deposits are literally payable upon the legal demand of
the customer. Commercial lending, on the other hand, has been given a functional definition
by the Board, dependent upon the factors of regularity in this category of lending and of
substantiality in total volume. See 12 C.F.R §§225.2(a)(1)(ii)(A), (B) (1984); Heller, supra note
57, at 11.
60. 12 U.S.C. §§1841(a)(2)(A), (B), (C).
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holding companies and their nonbanking subsidiaries to engage in
activities "closely related to banking." ' 6' Section 5 also is important
by granting the Board statutory authority "to issue such regulations
and orders as may be necessary to enable it to administer and carry
out" the purposes of the statute.62 Pursuant to this grant of authority,
the Board has promulgated the (in)famous "Regulation Y." 63
Under this regulation, the Board has named specific areas of
prohibited nonbanking acquisitions and activities,6" exempted certain
activities and acquisitions from general prohibitions, 6  established
procedures for applications, notice, and hearings that bank holding
companies must follow either to engage in nonbanking businesses de
novo or to acquire nonexempt nonbanking affiliates already engaged
in such practices,66 enacted a list of nonbanking activities that are
"so closely related to banking" that a bank holding company can
engage in them without being subject to the procedural requirements,67
and stated the factors it considers when acting on bank holding com-
pany applications to provide nonbanking services and other activities. 8
The central factor that the Board considers in the application deter-
mination process is a cost/benefit analysis. Under this analysis, the
Board is required to determine whether the benefits expected to flow
to the public from the bank holding company engaging in a non-
61. Section 4(c)(8), as codified in 12 U.S.C. §1843(c)(8) (1982). This section reads as follows:
[Exempted from the prohibitions in this section outlawing ownership or control by
a bank holding company of any shares of a nonbank company, or of engaging in
activities other than banking] shares of any company the activities of which the Board
after due notice and opportunity for hearing has determined (by order or regulation)
to be so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a
proper incident thereto ....
Id.
62. 12 U.S.C. §1844(b).





68. Id. §225.24. This subpart reads:
In evaluating an application or notice under §225.23 of this subpart, the Board shall
consider whether the performance by the applicant of the activity can reasonably
be expected to produce benefits to the public (such as greater convenience, increased
competition, the [sic] gains in efficiency) that outweigh possible adverse effects (such
as undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of
interest, and unsound banking practices). This consideration includes an evaluation
of the financial and managerial resources of the applicant, including its subsidiaries,
and any company to be acquired, and the effect of the proposed transaction on those
resources. Unless the record demonstrates otherwise, the commencement or expan-
sion of a nonbanking activity de novo is presumed to result in benefits to the public
through increased competition.
Id.
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banking business will outweigh the possible adverse effects that such
an engagement could cause. In making this determination, the Board
must consider the relative financial resources and managerial acumen
of each of the involved companies, and the possible effects the pro-
posed action will have on the wealth of each.
Although this is an amorphous explanation of the analysis that the
Board adheres to in weighing the public benefits of an applicant's
plan, this represents real-life uncertainty. The Board has never
articulated a laundry list of the factors considered in making the
cost/benefit determination; indeed, the Board expressly has left this
determination to be made on a case-by-case basis.69 The courts, mean-
while, are highly deferential to the "public benefits" determination.
No court has made an independent determination that a particular
proposed bank holding company activity was or was not likely to
produce public benefits sufficient to outweigh potential social costs. 70
This article now will turn to a more detailed analysis of both section
4(c)(8) and Regulation Y. Such an examination indicates that the in-
teraction between the statutory provision and the regulation has drilled
a gap into the wall separating commercial and investment banking.
Under the escort of their parent holding companies, affiliated com-
mercial banks have slithered through this gap, and become actively
involved in investment undertakings.
1. Section 4(c)(8) and Regulation Y: "Closely related... as
to be a proper incident thereto"
Section 16 of the National Bank Act grants banks "incidental powers
• . . necessary to carry on the business of banking."'7' In Arnold
Tours, Inc. v. Camp,7" the First Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that
bank activities were properly permissible under the incidental powers
provision if the activities under question were "convenient or useful
in connection with the performance of one of the bank's established
activities pursuant to its express powers under the National Bank Act."
69. Annot., 31 A.L.R. FED. 541.
70. Id.
71. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
72. 472 F.2d 427, 432 (1st Cir. 1972) (bank lacking the power to continue to travel agency
business despite authorization from the Comptroller); followed by National Retailers Corp.
v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 411 F. Supp. 308 (D.C. Ariz. 1976) (held that Retail Information System
service by bank to customers under auspices of Comptroller's regulation violated §16); M &
M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 563 F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir. 1977) (held leasing
of personal property, including motor vehicles, by a bank as lessor under authority of a regula-
tion promulgated by the Comptroller was both "convenient and useful" and pursuant to an
express banking power).
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Analytically, the Arnold Tours interpretation of the incidental powers
clause is powerful; the analysis clearly grounds the incidental powers
of banking into the penumbra of those express powers that Congress
specifically provided in the Act such as discounting, receiving deposits,
circulating exchange and notes, and lending. 73 The arguably related
language of section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA,7  however, has been inter-
preted by the United States Supreme Court not to require that the
proposed activity of a bank holding company affiliate be grounded
upon an express banking prerogative or facilitate any of the actual
banking operations of the holding company."
This interpretation by the court is based on Regulation Y. This
concise answer is, of course, cryptic and, as such, insufficient.
However, clarity and, perhaps, satisfaction can be achieved by con-
trasting two cases that the Supreme Court decided a decade apart.
In the more recent decision, the Court attempted a reconciliation of
the legislative goals that led to the creation of the Glass-Steagall and
Bank Holding Company Acts. First, the Court artfully narrowed the
prior interpretation of the regulatory breadth of Glass-Steagall. The
Court then found that Regulation Y, as amended, facially avoided
the proscriptions of "narrowed" Glass-Steagall. Finally, the Court
concluded that the Board had almost carte blanche authority to in-
terpret section 4(c)(8), the BHCA "closely related" powers provision. 7
Such a chain of illogic, even if leading to a clearer end, cries out
for closer analysis.
In Investment Company Institute v. Camp,7 7 the Court held that
the Comptroller lacked the power to authorize a bank to operate a
collective investment fund in competition with the mutual fund in-
dustry. More importantly, the Court elucidated those blatant dangers
and "subtle hazards" from which Congress, by enacting Glass-Steagall,
sought to immunize the commercial banking system.78
Ten years after Camp, the Court considered whether the Board had
73. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 61.
75. Securities Industry Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 104 S. Ct. 3003, 3008 (1984).
76. The Comptroller cannot even seem to sneak a data processing rule past the judiciary.
See National Retailers Corp. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 604 F.2d 32, 34 (9th Cir. 1979). On the
other hand, the Board can amass a unanimous Court to affirm a Board ruling that full discount
securities brokerage affiliation is a permissible nonbanking activity. See Securities Industry Ass'n
v. Board. of Governors, 104 S. Ct. 3003, 3012 (1984). Data processing is not only a "related"
function of operating a bank, but, given the volume of business even a small bank handles,
it is a necessary banking operation as well. By contrast, operating a discount brokerage house
has little or nothing to do with circulating currency, making loans, and receiving deposits.
77. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
78. For a listing of the "subtle hazards," see supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
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authority to permit a bank holding company, through a banking
affiliate, to act as an investment advisor to another affiliate that was
engaged solely in the business of closed-end investments and securities
dealing. In Board of Governors v. Investment Company Institute
(IC)," the Court held that the Board had such authority. In rationaliz-
ing the decision, the Court drew a curious distinction between the
situations presented in ICI and Camp.
First, the Court noted that a bank holding company could be
authorized to engage in some types of activities that would be illegal
if undertaken by an unaffiliated bank.8" Thus, even if a bank, standing
independent, could not perform closed-end investment advisory services
without violating the mandates of section 16 of Glass-Steagall, 8 or
section 21 of the same Act,8 2 or both, Glass-Steagall prohibitions would
not follow necessarily if identical conduct were undertaken by an af-
filiate of a bank holding company pursuant to Board interpretation
of section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA.83
Second, the Court admitted that Congress intended the BHCA "to
maintain and even strengthen Glass-Steagall's restrictions on the rela-
tionship between commercial and investment banking."8 Given this
admission, the question arises how the first and second premises, which
seemingly are contradictory, can be reconciled. This crossroad marks
the point where the Court engages in analytical sleight of hand. The
Court found that section 19(e) of the original Glass-Steagall Act of
193385 contained a loophole through which bank holding companies
could control or own affiliate corporations engaged principally in the
actual issuance or underwriting of securities issues. The only limita-
tion on the bank holding companies was that they could not vote
the shares of their bank subsidiaries.86 In other words, they could
vote the shares of their investment affiliates and all of their other
nonbanking affiliates. The BHCA plugged this loophole and, accord-
79. 450 U.S. 46 (1981).
80. Id. at 60 ("[m]oreover, bank affiliates may be authorized to engage in certain activities
that are prohibited to banks themselves").
81. In this particular case, however, the Court expressly found that section 16 was not
violated, given Board proscriptions against actual underwriting and dealing in securities. Id. at 62.
82. Unlike section 16, the Court was unsure whether the Board regulation permitting a
bank holding company to engage in the business of closed-end investment advising services
would pass muster under Section 21 if that regulation had been promulgated by the Com-
ptroller. Id. at 62-64.
83. Id. at 64.
84. Id. at 69 (emphasis added).
85. 48 Stat. 188 (1933).
86. Id.
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ing to the Court, strengthened the Glass-Steagall separation of the
businesses of investment and commercial banking.87
This form of carpentry, concluded the Court, marked the extent
of the relationship of the BHCA to its predecessor statute:
[n]othing in the legislative history of the Bank Holding Company
Act persuades us that Congress in 1956 intended to effect a more
complete separation between commercial and investment banking than
the separation that the Glass-Steagall Act had achieved with respect
to banks in [sections] 16 and 21 and had sought unsuccessfully to
achieve with respect to bank holding companies in [section] 19(e). 8
In effect, a loophole in Glass-Steagall was closed, which was at best
disputably important,8 9 while section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA emerged
unscathed from the investment limitations incorporated in sections 16
and 21 of Glass-Steagall.9"
After this preliminary conclusion, the Court found that Congress
did not intend the BHCA to "limit the Board's discretion to approve
securities-related activity as closely related to banking beyond the
prohibitions already contained in the Glass-Steagall Act." 9' Given the
breadth of section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA, the limited prohibitions still
relevant from Glass-Steagall would seem to be against affiliated activity
that amounted to the direct "issuing, underwriting, selling, or
distributing of securities."
When the above cases are interpreted in this light, the attempt by
the Court to distinguish the "subtle hazards" involved in Camp,92
yet simply ignored in 1I, is understandable. Those subtle hazards
do not exist in the latter case, according to the Court, since the
involved affiliated commercial bank could not extend credit to the
affiliated investment company, or underwrite or sell affiliate stock,
or become constantly involved in the search for new capital with which
to cover the costs of redeeming other securities that the investment
affiliate might purchase. Finally, the Camp-type promotional pressures
were found not to exist in ICI since the affiliated bank would receive
only a nominal advisory fee for any services provided to a sister
affiliate, and therefore would have "little incentive ' 93 to promote
investments with vigor.
87. 450 U.S. at 69-70.
88. Id. at 71.
89. Id. at 71 n.49.
90. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
91. 450 U.S. at 77.
92. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
93. 450 U.S. at 67.
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The analytical artistry of the Court displays the brush strokes of
a master. Yet the viewer is left to ponder an incongruous piece of
surrealism that defies pure analytical reason. Why will the affiliation
that exists between the companies, logically rooted in the mind of
the public, not lead to the build-up of promotional pressures on the
affiliated bank? The affiliates, after all, do share the same parent.
In cases such as ICI, the principle that an affiliated bank serves
as a mere advisor to sister investment affiliates, holding a detached
view toward their potential success or failure, appears intuitively
absurd. Is not this case a literal restatement of the very type of facts
that concerned the Court in Camp?94 The author does not intend to
imply the Camp subtle hazards criteria have been totally read out
of section 4(c)(8) cases. Instead, the author expressly states that the
applicability of the subtle hazards standards in such cases seems
restricted to the "narrowed" cases of direct engagement by the
investment affiliate of the bank holding company in the issuing, under-
writing, selling, and redeeming of securities.
That the author's interpretation is consistent with current law is
illustrated by consideration of recent amendments to Regulation Y.
Further consistency can be garnered upon reading the most recent
Supreme Court case pertaining to the issue. Both of these current
developments will be discussed in the next subsection of this article.
The author will demonstrate that these developments translate into
a direct bank holding company expansion into the investment field.
2. Expansion into the Securities Field
We have seen that the Board possesses broad discretion to deter-
mine what activities are "closely related" to banking. This author
has speculated that such authority, given the ICI analysis, could extend
up to the literal prohibitions of Glass-Steagall. The outer limits may
have been reached in the recent case of Securities Industry Associa-
tion v. Board of Governors (SIA 11).91 In SIA II, the Supreme Court
held that Bank America Corporation, holding company of Bank of
America, the largest commercial bank in the United States, could
acquire one of the largest retail securities brokerage corporations as
an affiliate in accordance with section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA and the
regulations prescribed by the Board.
The rationale of the Court displays the full implications of the
"closely related" test. Section 4(c)(8) requires the Board to make two
94. 401 U.S. at 631.
95. 104 S. Ct. 3003 (1984).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 16
determinations when listing activities as permissible under Regulation
Y.96 First, is the activity "closely related" to banking?" If so, then
can the particular activity be expected to produce possible public
benefits that outweigh potential harmful effects? On judicial review
of the determinations by the Board, great deference is given by the
courts to the banking expertise of the Board.98 Deference is due because
section 4(c)(8) fails to specify any factor that the Board must consider
in making the "closely related" determination. Thus, the Court ruled
that "Congress vested the Board with considerable discretion to con-
sider and weigh a variety of factors in determining whether an activi-
ty is 'closely related' to banking. ' 99
From this broad congressional grant of discretion, the Board has
adopted, and the courts have acquiesced in, a "functional and opera-
tional" testing criterion for determining whether an activity is "closely
related to banking." In SIA II, the Court deferred to the Board deter-
mination that discount brokerage activities were "closely related" to
banking. The Board reasoned that because such brokerage services
were similar in nature to the practice of banks acting solely as agents
for their customers' orders, a practice specifically permitted by section
16 of Glass-Steagall,' 0 then no section 4(c)(8) violation occurred. The
acquisition by Bank America Corporation therefore was legal.
The assumption by the Board and the Court that discount brokerage
houses act as pure agents or fiduciaries for their customers' invest-
ment decisions is controversial at best.' 0' Moreover, detailed analysis
of the relevant subpart of Regulation Y reveals that the Court may
96. Id.
97. The "closely related" standard is in fact a misnomer. In determining whether an activity
is closely related, the Board must ask whether banks generally have undertaken such an activi-
ty, if the activity is of such a nature that banks are operationally or functionally equipped
to provide it, and whether banks generally provide services so integrally related to the proposed
activity as to require their provision in a specialized form. See National Courier Ass'n v. Board
of Governors, 516 F.2d 1229, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Were this the final test, it would be
quite analogous to the restrictions placed on the Comptroller when he or she determines what
is a permitted incidental banking power- i.e., a direct relationship would be required, in the
case of "closely related," between a recognized banking service and the contested activity. This,
however, is not the final test. The Board has stated that it will not be limited exclusively to
the National Courier guidelines; rather, the Board will consider "any ... factor that an appli-
cant may advance to demonstrate a reasonable or close connection or relationship to the activity
of banking." 49 Fed. Reg. 806 (1984) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has acceded to
the assertion of the Board. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 104 S. Ct. 3003,
3006 n.5 (1984).
98. Securities Indus. Ass'n., 104 S. Ct. at 3008.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. To those of us who are cynics at mind, the conclusive statement by the Court on
this point may well make us smile.
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be on the wrong side of the controversy, since the Board is prepared
to go beyond the parameters of SIA I.
Section 225.25(b)(4) details permissible nonbanking investment or
financial advisory activity.' 2 Subpart (ii) permits those kinds of
advisory services that occurred in SIA II, while the very next subpart,
(iii), permits portfolio advice "to any other person." In a footnote
to this subpart, bank holding companies and their subsidiaries are
abjured to "observe the standards of care and conduct applicable to
fiduciaries."' 3 Moreover, subpart (iv) permits affiliated commercial
banks to sell general economic information and advice, as well as
to undertake and distribute general economic statistical forecasting
and industry studies.' 4 Finally, section 225.25(b)(15) permits bank
holding company acquisitions of affiliated securities brokerage con-
cerns that are restricted to the buying and selling of securities solely
as agent for their customers' accounts. In this last case, any provi-
sion of investment advice and research services by the affiliated com-
mercial bank to sister investment affiliates is proscribed.
Clearly, the Board has distinguished securities brokerage activity
from investment and financial advisory activity. Seemingly, a bank
holding company could acquire a closed-end investment company as
in SIA II, sponsor, organize, and manage the affiliate in an invest-
ment advisory capacity through the expertise of an affiliated com-
mercial bank,"0 5 and also provide portfolio investment advice "to any
other person."'0 1 6 The affiliated bank advises customers as "other
persons" on potential portfolio investments, while advising investment
affiliates as well. Such an inherent conflict-of-interest situation is
presented by Board regulations, and would be consistent with SIA
II analysis.
The author's concern may be of only academic interest because no
Board or court decision has addressed this fact pattern to date. The
above example from Regulation Y nevertheless underscores the point.
With the exception of "narrowed" Glass-Steagall, the Board, with
the blessing of the judiciary, is in the process of permitting bank
holding companies to make substantial inroads into the securities field.
102. 12 C.F.R. §225.25(b)(4).
103. How a warning hidden in a footnote of an agency regulation is supposed to elevate
the nature of the fiduciary relationship to a standard commensurate with the statutory duty
required of actual underwriters and dealers by the Securities Act of 1933 is not explained.
104. "Management consulting," detailed information and analyses of a particular firm, is
prohibited.
105. 12 C.F.R. §225.25(b)(4)(ii).
106. 12 C.F.R. §225.25(b)(4)(iii).
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The remaining applicability to the Board of the Camp subtle hazards
concerns is an open question. 07 This author now will attempt to predict
the potential problems and possibilities that could arise from a
continued lenient policy by the Board and the courts in permitting
affiliated commercial banks to operate in the investment industry.
C. Problems and Possibilities
The Camp Court stated that the purpose of Congress in enacting
Glass-Steagall was to protect depository safety." 8 Security would be
assured, and public concerns assauged, through the divorce of invest-
ment banking from commercial banking. The settlement would relieve
the pressures causing unsound investment and marginal lending
practices, questionable promotional schemes, and other malevolent
manifestations projected by conflict of interest. The credit granting
and promotional pressures broadly can be classified as problems of
full disclosure.
1. Disclosure
As they continue their involvement in the investment field, banks
are subject to rigorous regulatory structures. These structures, however,
are designed to ensure depository protection and banking system
stability. Solvency is the regulatory goal, and, although a modicum
of public disclosure is required by banking regulations, the amount
of disclosure is of a lesser sum than the amount of disclosure brokers
must give under the Securities and Exchange Acts. 109
The Acts, enforced by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC),
seek to protect investors by controlling unethical business practices'
via strict agency enforcement of the statutes and frequent public
disclosure."' Banks are excluded from the disclosure provisions of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 because that Act specifically
107. Was the BHCA really enacted to "maintain" Glass-Steagall? See supra note 84 and
accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
109. 15 U.S.C. §§77q, 78; see also Evans, Regulation of Bank Securities Activities, 91 BANK-
ING L.J. 611, 612 (1976) (concentration of financial resources in banks, added to regulatory
differences, will undermine effect of Glass-Steagall and harm securities industry); Note, supra
note 40, 81 MIcH. L. Rav. 1498, 1529-30; Mowder, Regulations Covering Bank's Securities
Brokerage, 123 TR. & EsT. 47, 49-50 (1984).
110. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
111. Note, The Legality of Bank-Sponsored Investment Services, 84 YALE L.J. 1477, 1499
(1975) (bank "enforcement proceedings are not as well publicized as those of the SEC, which
announces disciplinary actions relating even to minor infractions").
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exempts banks from the definitions of "broker" and "dealer. '" 2
Banks, however, are not free from public disclosure requirements.
Operationally, SEC and local exchange rules on disclosure, confir-
mation, and investment recommendations indirectly could be placed
on commercial banks because of the relationships between banks and
broker-dealers, who are subject to regulatory restraints. 1 3
In the context of a bank holding company, however, these secon-
dary regulatory relationships prove even more tenuous. The bank
affiliate, for instance, could communicate with the brokerage affiliate
through the chain of one or more other affiliates, perhaps through
an investment advisory affiliate in a manner similar to our hypothetical
case above, or through a parent holding company. Disclosure to bank
customers, as well as to the general public, therefore, can be obscured
in the labyrinth of affiliation. How may promotional and investment
pressures generated by this intercorporate maze be curtailed, especially
given the "any . . . factor""' 4 criterion of the Board on permissible
nonbanking activities and permissive current outlook on proper banking
investment activity? This certainly would have been a matter of concern
to the Glass-Steagall Congress that sought to maintain bank stability,
as well as to the BHCA Congress that desired to "maintain and
strengthen" the Glass-Steagall separation of commercial and investment
banking.'
112. 15 U.S.C. §§78b-78ii. A caveat with respect to holding companies should be added.
Although an affiliated bank is excluded definitionally, such is not the case for the other affiliated
corporate entities of the holding company, if they are engaged in brokerage activities.
113. Mowder, supra note 109, at 49.
114. See supra note 97.
115. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. The first draft of this article was criticized
for overemphasizing the disclosure problem. One professor with banking expertise suggested
that I argue current bank holding company disclosure requirements be supplanted by Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) jurisdiction. The good professor's suggestion mirrors then
SEC Commissioner John Evans' prediction of what would in fact occur. Evans, supra note
109, at 619.
Upon reflection, I have decided to remain firm in my original position. The disclosure problem
is reflective of interpretations of the purposes of Glass-Steagall. For instance, in the Yale Law
Journal note, the student author offered the thesis that existing disclosure requirements for
bank-sponsored investment services were adequate. Note, supra note 111, at 1503-04. His thesis,
however, is based on the ridiculous assumption that investment activities by banks are facially
within section 16 and do not violate other provisions of the Act. Id. at 1487-90. Commissioner
Evans disagrees, finding banks and securities firms to be direct competitors in the investment
markets despite Glass-Steagall restrictions. Evans, supra note 109, at 613-14. Ironically, Com-
missioner Evans makes a statement of which our Yale student should take note: "I have dif-
ficulty understanding how any disinterested person could oppose redressing this [disclosure]
imbalance. . . ." Id. at 615.
Why I part company with the professor and commissioner is based on my reading of Glass-
Steagall. Investment affiliates of bank holding companies are undertaking the types of investments
that Glass-Steagall was to eliminate. This is the point I am making with respect to "narrowed"
Glass-Steagall. A new statute saddling SEC-type disclosure restrictions on affiliated commercial
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2. Conflict-of-Interest
The pressures inherent in those situations in which banks act as
investment advisor both to sellers, investment companies, and buyers,
bank customers, led the Camp Court to fear that a conflict of interest
would develop between banks and their customers. Saddled by the
connection, banks would support investment concerns, promotional-
ly and financially, during times of sustained market decline. This type
of support to investment concerns is anathema to the advertised role
of banks as pure fiduciary and agent. The weak attempt by the ICI
Court to distinguish the relationship presented in Camp from that
of a bank affiliate and sister brokerage affiliates is particularly
unpersuasive.
In a footnote in ICI, the Court admitted that "this association [in
the public's mind between a bank affiliate and an investment company
affiliate] cannot be completely obliterated;" ' 6 nevertheless, the Court
proclaimed that protection to the public would come from the
requirement of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act that performances
of large securities portfolios of common trust funds be published." 7
The ICI Court, however, did not indicate how this publication will
prevent conflict of interest, and loss of public confidence should
investments turn sour.""
Recent Court decisions place considerable emphasis on the affilia-
tion distinction between subsidiaries of a parent holding corporation.
Intuitively, the distinction between a parent bank corporation with
a subsidiary investment company and an affiliated bank corporation
with a one-step removed relationship with a sister affiliated invest-
ment firm, through a parent bank holding company, does not
obliterate, or even assuage, the underlying pressures caused by a close
connection between the investment and banking concerns. Simply,
treating the holding company affiliation case differently than the direct
subsidiary relationship case represents a differing treatment devoid
of analytical substance. "Strengthened" Glass-Steagall, however,
banks could only be interpreted as legislative acquiescence in these types of investing. In sum,
disclosure differences are a symptom of the sickness, not the directing agent. Those doctors
of law who suggest we treat the symptom have thereby condemned their patient.
116. 450 U.S. at 67 n.39.
117. Id; see also 15 U.S.C. §78m(O.
118. The Court did note that the interpretive ruling by the Board prohibited banks from
giving the names of depositors to their investment company affiliates. This, reasoned the Court,
would prohibit a bank from "[straying] from its obligation to render impartial advice to its
customers .... " 450 U.S. at 67 n.39. This reasoning is particularly unsatisfying, since, although
the bank could not distribute investment company literature, or otherwise orally express an
opinion on the advisability of company investments, nothing prohibited bank employees from
identifying the investment affiliate to customers.
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applies to the direct case through sections 16 and 21, while "narrowed"
Glass-Steagall applies to the holding company situation by way of
section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA. The distinction, one of mere multicor-
porate organizational form rather than actual operating substance,
posits the question of what consequences might be inflicted onto the
banking system from the very real risks that we have just uncovered.
3. Does History Repeat Itself?
The author is certainly not volunteering to join the multitude of
prognosticators of doom and gloom. ' 9 The economy will not be put
to such a rout in the foreseeable future that the financial movers of
the United States will take screaming leaps from atop the skyscrapers
abutting Wall Street-however efficacious such conduct could prove
to be. Still, that the dangers awaiting the unwary-and they are
unwary, if the opinion by the Board of Governors in Citicorp2 ' is
indicative-are quite real and imminent.
These realistic dangers can be illustrated by the curious case of some
short-term, high denomination commercial paper. In A.G. Becker Inc.
v. Board of Governors,'2' a circuit court majority agreed with the
Board that, not only was commercial paper of this kind not a
"security" within the meaning of Glass-Steagall,' 22 but that invest-
ment in the same by banks "is less risky even than banks' ordinary
commercial lending."' 23 In sum, the relative riskless nature of large
denomination, short-term commercial paper precluded categorization
as a speculative investment covered by Glass-Steagall.
119. For a collection of recent essays dealing with these dismal concerns, see Watchtel,
CRIsIs IN THE EcoNomC AND FriANcui. STRucnrt (1982). The title headings to four chapters
display the general optimism of the works included within: Monetary Crisis, Bankruptcy Issues,
International Crisis, and Speculative Bubbles. Id.
120. In that case, not only did the Board note the "any factor" test on permissible banking
activities, but it applied the three-pronged National Courier test in a disjunctive fashion. That
is, if the challenged activity could pass muster under any one prong, the activity was "closely
related" and hence permissible. Citicorp, New York, New York, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 505, 506
(1982).
121. 693 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors,
104 S. Ct. 2979 (1984). Granted, the Supreme Court reversed on the ground that commercial
paper was a "security" and hence under the auspices of Glass-Steagall. Moreover, the same
"subtle hazards" at work in Camp were determined to be at work in this case as well. Id.
at 2984-86. However, sections 16 and 21 of Glass-Steagall were implicated because a state com-
mercial bank sought to enter the third-party commercial paper market. On the other hand,
a bank holding company, through an affiliated securities dealer, could certainly deal in third-
party commercial paper under the BHCA §4(c)(8) "closely related" test. SIA II, the companion
case of SIA I, is clear support of the author's proposition. Why the Camp concerns are implicated
in the former case, but not the latter, should again make us smile.
122. A.G. Becker, Inc., 693 F.2d at 150-51.
123. Id. at 149.
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The notion that such paper is relatively risk free, however, and
therefore outside the Glass-Steagall concerns as articulated in Camp,
was dispelled in a dissenting opinion by Senior Circuit Judge Robb.' 24
Initially, Judge Robb quickly disposed of the notion of the majority
that a bank acting in the role of commercial lender was analogous
to the same bank acting in the role of seller in the sale of third-party
commercial securities.'1 5
Next, Judge Robb conjured the spectre of the defunct Penn Central
Company, which defaulted on $82.5 million in "prime" commercial
paper.' 26 Not only did the corporate collapse of Penn Central cause
those same dramatic consequences as was foreshadowed by the Camp
Court, 27 the Penn Central case also serves to illustrate the very real
"ripple effects" that can occur when bank investments fail. In this
case, the investment firm of Goldman, Sache & Co. sold $5 million
of Penn Central commercial paper to the American Express Company.
This sale predated the corporate drowning of Penn Central by just
seven weeks. Clearly, Penn Central was floundering in the water, ready
to turn belly-up, at the time American Express, one of the most
sophisticated investment conglomerates in the country, deposited an
additional $5 million into Davey Jones' Locker.
The hazards present when financial incentive exists to give unreliable
investment advice, therefore, are manifest,2 8 even in cases of alleged
risk-free investment activity. Continued expansion up to the limits
of narrowed Glass-Steagall is inevitable. Even this limit, perhaps, will
be breached in the not too distant future.
In any event, the author does not wish to relegate the role of the
commercial banker to that of warden over his depositor's funds.
Financial areas exist in which commercial banks should be allowed
to expand and compete with increased vigor. These areas include
depository gathering, even beyond the traditional demand deposit
category, and commercial-personal lending fields. Within these areas
thrifts and "nonbank banks" seriously threaten the commercial
banker's ability to operate efficiently. This article, therefore, will
124. Id. at 152 (Robb, J., dissenting).
125. Id. (A bank as lender "place[s] its funds at risk"; whereas a bank as seller of commercial
paper "has no direct financial interest in the issuer's ability to meet its. . . obligations.")
126. Id. at 153.
127. In this case, loss of confidence occurs when the actual result stands in stark contrast
to the predicted result of the promotional literature, creation of pressure causes distortion of
credit decisions leading to unsound loans, and loss of key customer goodwill jeopardizes the
financial soundness of the bank. Id. at 153-54.
128. Id. at 154.
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examine this side of the affiliated commercial bank expansion dilem-
ma, and will discern how such a threat might be repulsed.
THE THREAT FROM TiE TH-RFTs
Two points must be made prior to discussion of the author's
antitrust polemic. First, those savings and loan institutions that are
guilty of poor investment are beyond the scope of this article, which
examines competition between banks and other financial institutions.
Second, despite public conceptions to the contrary, savings and loan
associations are not banks. Before discussion can commence on
commercial banking competition, therefore, this author must define
the institutions that are considered "banks."
A. Banks and Nonbanks
1. What is a "Bank"?
In United States v. Phildelphia National Bank,"9 the Supreme Court
decided for the first time a case dealing with the antitrust aspects
of commercial banking.' 30 Faced with the novelty of the issue, the
Court logically began with a historical description of commercial
banking. The majority, however, erred at the outset, saying that
"[c]ommercial banking in this country is primarily unit banking." 1 3'
Commercial banking in this country actually is under the umbrella
of a highly centralized regulatory system. The Court next defined the
object "commercial bank" as an institution that is alone permitted
by law to accept demand deposits;' 32 that is a dealer and source of
money and credit to individuals, entities, and the nation;' 33 that is
an intermediary of most financial transactions;1 31 that is a repository
of funds;' 35 and that is the chief supplier of short term credit.' 6 Among
these aspects, the Court identified as the most important functions
of commercial banking the creation of money and credit, the manage-
ment of the checking account system, and the furnishing of short-
term business loans.' 
3 7
129. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
130. Id. at 324.
131. Id. at 325.





137. Id. at 326-27.
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Additionally, another perspective emerged in Philadelphia National.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan agreed with the list of necessary
conditions that made up a "commercial bank." He placed more im-
portance, however, on the role of commercial banks in the national
economy via their ability to control the money supply.'38
With respect to judicial definitions for antitrust purposes, the
Philadelphia National definition of "commercial banking," with the
two possible prongs of emphasis, has remained the standard.' With
the continual blurring of the lines separating banking, insurance,
securities, and real estate activities, however, the judicial definition
of the banking business 4' has amassed no greater number of adherents
than many other definitions. To understand the recent plethora of
academic attempts'' in the area, Professor Symons' recent work is
illustrative. 4
Symons identifies a narrow and a broad view of the banking
business. The narrow view is predicated on the principle of expressio
unis est exclusio alterius; that is, the "business of banking" is not
an independent source of authority and the only powers a bank legally
can exercise are those powers specifically enumerated in the National
Bank Act.'43 Such powers"' closely parallel those conditions listed
by the Court in Philadelphia National.
Symons' analysis of the judiciary ends here, but the author wishes
138. Id. at 374-75 (Harland, J., dissenting).
139. See, e.g., County Nat'l Bancorp. and TGB Co. v. Board of Governors, 654 F.2d 1253(8th Cir. 1981), decided en banc; Mercantile Texas Corp. v. Board of Governors, 638 F.2d
1255 (5th Cir. 1981). But see also United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974),
where, though the conditions listed in Philadelphia National were followed, the Court, to
distinguish the growing similarity between commercial and savings banking, emphasized the
larger volume of commercial service financing undertaken by commercial banks. This financing
was of the short-term business loan nature emphasized by the majority in Philadelphia National.
Though only a little more than a decade passed between these two decisions, the Court recognized
the role of savings banks in financing commercial ventures, sometimes of a relatively short-
term nature, and the diversity of commercial bank financing, which evolved from straight business
lending to sophisticated financing of investment plans and big-time commercial paper. At the
very least, this is a diversion of emphasis from Philadelphia National in what is a "commercial
bank," if not an outright different definition. Did the Court make this distinction with the
wish of updating the working definition to modern reality? Or was the distinction a device
to avoid the method that the district court adopted in the case, to combine commercial and
savings banks in the same product market for antitrust analysis? These questions certainly will
be addressed in the pages that follow.
140. The phrase "the business of banking" has been in every National Bank Act since
the original 1864 Act. For the modern statute, see 12 U.S.C. §24(7) (1982).
141. See, e.g., Huck, The Business of Banking, 21 Bus. LAW. 537 (1966); Symons, The
"Business of Banking" in Historical Perspective, 51 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 676 (1983); Wallison,
Banking Regulatory System Badly in Need of Reform, LEoAL Tossas, June 27, 1983, at 27, col. 1.
142. Symons, supra note 141, at 678.
143. Id. at 679.
144. See 12 U.S.C. §24(7) (1982).
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to build upon it. Like Symons, the author interprets the judicial defini-
tion of "the business of banking" and its subcomponent, "commer-
cial banking," as definitionally restrictive. By contrast, the judicial
definition of permissible "closely related" activities to commercial
banking is almost licentious. '45 We have seen this with respect to the
discussion of bank holding company investment undertakings. From
a logical standpoint, the definitional distinction of the Court certainly
is not illegitimate, and arguably may serve to ameliorate widely dif-
ferent extremes. This definitional distinction, however, does stand as
our first reason why line-of-commerce markets are construed narrowly,
while activities related to such markets are treated broadly. This distinc-
tion may appear out of context at this point in our discussion, but
for pedagogical purposes the distinction is easiest to draw at this time.
Professor Symons argues that the broad view of the "business of
banking" interprets the phrase as an independent source of banking
authority; thus, the enumerated powers in the National Bank Act
merely serve as guideposts, not as an exhaustive list, of the types
of banking conduct permissible.' 6 Finally, Professor Symons cham-
pions his own position, an intermediate view. Namely, the phrase "the
business of banking" is a psuedo-grant of independent authority,
grounded in the types of activities expressly enumerated, while limited
by law and the policy considerations of depository safety and economic
neutrality with respect to credit decisions.' 47 In contrast to the dogmatic
efforts of the Judiciary, the more expansive academic attempts are
grounded functionally; that is, they focus on what banks can and
ought to do within the confines of congressional guideposts and public
policy manifestations.
As promised, this article will not develop a definitive definition of
"banking." A definitional "notion" with which to operate, however,
will be determined. "Banking," therefore, includes the historical prac-
tices banks have displayed for over the last century plus various ac-
tivities grounded within these historical practices yet altered or created
anew to meet modern demands. To refine our efforts further, we must
ask when an institution that is arguably a bank under the above
analysis is not in fact a bank.
2. Doublespeak: "Nonbank Banks" (Or, A is Not-A)
Centuries ago, the great Greek philosopher Aristotle pondered over
145. See supra notes 80-94 and accompanying text.
146. Symons, supra note 141, at 679-80.
147. Id. at 680-84.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 16
the problem of the foundation of knowledge. To Aristotle, if the foun-
dation called "justified true belief" could be established, the
methodology of syllogistic logic would lead mankind down the path
of correct thought. The foundation upon which Aristotle constructed
his epistemological edifice was that of identity. That is, an object
is what it is. Existence is to exist; thought is to think; A is A.
With the usual ups and downs-and some fascinating downright
doubts' 8-mankind has found the concept of identity indispensable
to the attainment of true knowledge. Those involved in the business
of banking, and the regulators of the same, however, are not by nature
an inquisitive species.' 9 The BHCA defines a bank as an institution
that accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw
on demand, and, at the same time, engages in the business of making
commercial loans. If the bank, however, fulfilled one of these defini-
tional requirements but not the other, then it would be a nonbank
bank.'15 In this capacity, it could perform almost the same functions
as a commercial bank-such as lend funds, maintain trust depart-
ments, exchange currency, and operate a checking department-yet
escape the restrictions of the BHCA by deleting one or the other of
the essential definitional elements.1 5'
In sum, our operational definition of banking, and of an affiliated
commercial bank in particular, cannot remain grounded solely in a
narrow historical interpretation that is tempered by modern academic
criticism. The definition must be refined further by ludicrous
terminology. Still, the definition is operational, and, as such, is in-
148. For an illustration of such doubts, called skepticism, see, e.g., DESCARTES, MEDITA-
TION ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY (1641); LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNINa HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1894);
BERKELEY, THREE DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS (1713); RUSSELL, THE PROBLEMIS
OF PHILOSOPHY (1912); NoZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS (1981).
Nozick's modern example, of how we might not know that an object is even an object,
rivals Descartes' renown "evil demon" example, and thus will be used here. Surely, you say
to yourself, you know that you are reading this note. But do you? Logically, you could be
floating prostrate in a tank of water on the planet Alpha Centuri. There, super-psychologists
are stimulating your mind to give you this and every other sensation that you have ever ex-
perienced (and will ever experience-evil demons indeed!). Should this prove to be the case,
then the author hopes the Alpha Centurians will soon grant you more provocative stimulation,
rather than continue torturing you in this manner.
149. They are acquisitive animals, a point to be made later.
150. For an in-depth analysis of the "nonbank bank" phenomenon, see Lobell, Nonbank
Banks: Controversy Over a New Form of Consumer Bank, 39 Bus. LAW. 1193 (1984).
151. See, e.g., First Bancorporation v. Board of Governors, 728 F.2d 434, 436 (10th Cir.
1984) (held Utah industrial loan company was not a commercial bank since "Utah law specifically
proscribes [such companies] from accepting demand deposits"); Wilshire Oil Co. v. Board of
Governors, 668 F.2d 732, 739 (3d Cir. 1981) (held affiliated institution of holding company
was a "bank" because the reservation of right to 14 days advanced notice of withdrawal from
deposits was a sham to avoid the BHCA). See also infra note 178.
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dispensable to the final duty of this article, which is to turn away
from the investment field and consider the expansion of commercial
banking into various commercial financing and depository collecting
fields. At this point, of primary concern is one of the most common
forms of enterprise expansion, expansion by combination through
merger or acquisition. Of course, the antitrust laws are implicated
because of the Philadelphia National decision. This "practical
response" that regulates expansionary activities within the commer-
cial banking context now will be considered.
B. The Practical Response: Antitrust Regulation
Current antitrust law mirrors banking law because it also remains
the captive of flux and uncertainty. 5 2 Bank holding company law
has been chained to its fellow antitrust prisoner by statute.' The
BHCA requires that the Board, on considering an acquisition of a
bank by a bank holding company, examine the anticompetitive aspects
of the transaction. If the anticompetitive costs are not outweighed
clearly by the benefits that will accrue to the public interest should
the combination occur, then the Board must deny application for the
merger or acquisition."' When quantifying the public interest criterion,
the Board weighs the following factors: the needs and conveniences
of the community, the financial and managerial resources of the
organizations involved, the future prospects of the concerns, and the
capital structures of the involved banks.'55
That the anticompetitive standard the Board considers is the same
152. See, e.g., Grady, Introduction to the Symposium on Current Developments in Antitrust
Law, 9 J. CoRP. LAW 573 (1984).
153. 12 U.S.C. §§1842(c)(1), (2) (factors that the Board must consider in determining whether
to approve an application for a bank holding company, or a company that would become
one if approval is granted, to acquire assets or shares of a bank).
The Board shall not approve-l) any acquisition or merger or consolidation under
this section which would result in a monopoly, or which would be in furtherance
of any combination or conspiracy to monopolize the business of banking in any part
of the United States, or (2) any other proposed acquisition or merger or consolida-
tion under this section whose effect in any section of the country may be substantially
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly, or which in any other man-
ner would be in restraint or [sic] trade, unless it finds that the anticompetitive effects
of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the pro-
bable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the com-
munity to be served.
Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. For a general overview of the statute, see Hakala and Austin, Denials of BHC
Formations and Acquisitions: Has There Been a Shift In Policy?, 99 BANKING L.J. 947, 948-49
(1982).
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as the standard under the general antitrust laws'1 6 is a rule
demonstrated by case law. For instance, in County National Bancor-
poration v. Board of Governors,' the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected the contention of the Board that the "convenience and needs
of the community" language of section 3(c)(2)' 58 of the BHCA was
a congressional grant of authority to the Board to apply its own an-
ticompetitive standard, even if that standard should prove more strict
than the one used in cases brought under the Sherman and Clayton
Acts. Indeed, the court held that, given the expressly articulated com-
mand of Congress that both administrative agencies and courts apply
the antitrust statutes in a uniform fashion, section 3(c)(2) of the BHCA
therefore must have set an anticompetitive standard identical to that
set by the Sherman and Clayton Acts." 9
Because the anticompetitive standards are the same in all of the
antitrust statutes, the analysis used in Clayton Act antitrust cases to
determine the competitive effects of an acquisition or a merger will
be developed in this article concomitantly with the way the courts
have applied this anticompetitive analysis to the banking industry
specifically through section 3(c)(2) of the BHCA. Of prime impor-
tance will be the question whether, as applied to banking, the judicial
analysis has been too hard-line, given the restrictive definition of the
terms "banking" and "commercial bank."' 60 In addressing the
combination question, antitrust law looks to the line-of-commerce,
or product market, the geographic market, and to various types of
competition that may occur within these markets.
1. The "line-of-commerce"
Mergers are regulated by section 7 of the Clayton Act. In Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States,'6' the Supreme Court commented upon
the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Amendments to section 7. These amendments
enacted three changes in the section. First, the present "substantially
156. The relevant provision of the Sherman Act provides that "[elvery contract, combina-
tion . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, ...
is declared to be illegal." Moreover, the Act provides that "[elvery person who shall monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire . . . to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States .... shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . ." 15
U.S.C. §§I and 2 (1982). This article, however, is concerned predominately with section 7 of
the Clayton Act. For the relevant provision of that Act, see supra note 8.
157. 654 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1981).
158. See supra note 153.
159. 654 F.2d 1253, 1259-60.
160. See supra notes 129-47 and accompanying text.
161. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
1985 / Merger and Acquisition
to lessen competition" language was added. Second, acquisitions of
assets was added to the already-covered acquisitions of stock. Third,
vertical mergers were placed under the ambit of the Act., 62 The Brown
Shoe Court continued the preliminary analysis of section 7 by noting
that two issues were raised by the Clayton Act, the relevant "line-of-
commerce" and the proper "section of the country.' 6 s3 With respect
to the first issue, the Court declared that Congress amended the original
definition in the Clayton Act of the "line-of-commerce" in order to
"halt the rising tide of economic concentration in particular lines of
commerce" 61 in the incipient states of the problem.'65 Following this
broad overview of the Act and amendments, the Court turned to an
analysis of the factors that had to be considered in order to define
the proper product market. First, the Court constructed the broadest
parameter of this market: "The outer boundaries of a product market
are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-
elasticity of demand'66 between the product itself and substitutes for
it." 6 7 The Court, however, limited this broad construction by noting
that "within this broad market, well-defined submarkets may exist
that, in themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust
purposes."'' 68 The boundaries of such submarkets, the Court concluded,
are determinable by "examining such practical indicia as industry or
public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity,
the product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique productive
facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes,
and specialized vendors."' 69
Generally, the broader the market as defined by the above indicia,
the relatively more competitive such a market will prove to be. For
instance, assume two Iowa City bookstores wish to merge their opera-
162. Previously, only horizontal mergers were covered under the Clayton Act. See SULLIVAN
& HOVENKAmp, ANTrrRusT LAW POLICY AND PROCEDURE (1984) at 587.
163. 370 U.S. at 298. For an analysis of the "section of the country," see infra notes
190-202 and accompanying text.
164. 370 U.S. at 315.
165. Id. at 313-14.
166. Cross-elasticity of demand is an economic term, quantifying a rate of substitution be-
tween a price change in one product and demand changes in others. For instance, assume the
price of a one dollar pound of chocolate increased by 50 cents. We could expect consumers
of that chocolate pound to purchase a less expensive chocolate product from a different com-
pany, or to substitute entirely and buy, for example, vanilla wafers. When this occurs, the
chocolate demand curve is said to be elastic. If no one switched from, or substituted, another
product, then the cross-elasticity of demand would be zero, or totally inelastic. If, on the other
hand, all chocolate pound consumers substituted or switched, the cross-elasticity for the chocolate
pound would be one, or perfectly elastic.
167. 370 U.S. at 325.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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tions under the name "Merged Books, Inc." (MBI). Within the city
limits of Iowa City are approximately twenty bookstores,' 70 and, with
the exception of the two major textbook retailers, no single book
vendor is of a significantly larger size than any competitors. Therefore,
if this product market is defined broadly as "books," then the MBI
merger would have little to no anticompetitive effect on the Iowa
City book retail market.
On the other hand, consider the effect if the formerly independent
stores that made up the MBI merger each sold rare books, and Iowa
City has only two such stores.' 7' If these retailers merged, and the
relevant product market was defined as "rare books," then this merger
would result in the creation of market monopoly. In antitrust jargon,
the Iowa City rare book market would be quantified by a "concen-
tration ratio"' 72 of 100%.
Consequently, defendants in challenged merger or acquisition cases
argue for the broadest product market definition conceivable, while
170. See Iowa City Telephone Directory.
171. Id.
172. "Market concentration" is a quantitative term that measures how much of a defined
product and geographic market specified firms "control" before and after a merger. For purposes
of illustration, the 1982 Justice Department merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493 (1982),
will be used. In determining whether a proposed merger will result in undue market concentra-
tion, and thus tend to cause illegal anticompetitive effects, the Justice Department uses the
"Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index" (HHI) of market concentration. Assume a market consists
of four firms, two of which each control 30 percent of the market, while the remaining two
have 20 percent shares of the market. The HHI simply adds the sum of the squares, or, in
our example, 30'+301+202+201=2600. An HHI below 1000 is characterized as unconcentrated, be-
tween 1000 and 1800 as moderately concentrated, and above 1800 as highly concentrated. Since
the sum of the squares is the equation, the greater the number of firms controlling relatively
limited market shares, the lower the HHI, and vice versa. For instance, in the 20-firm Iowa
City bookstores example, assuming each firm controlled an identical five percent of the market,
the HHI for this market would be 500, an unconcentrated market. On the other hand, our
rare book market example would give a premerger HHI, if both firms controlled 50 percent
of the market, of 5,000, a very concentrated market.
The above step represents part one of the HHI analysis, the premerger stage. The next step
is, naturally enough, the postmerger stage. Since the premerger equation was the sum of the
squares, the two merging firms in the premerger stage algebraically can be represented as a'+ b'.
Since, in the postmerger stage, the firms would combine their operations, then this is represented
algebraically as the sum of their market shares squared, or (a+b)'. This equation, when multiplied
out, equals a'+2ab+b'. Clearly, the change in the HHI from premerger sum to postmerger
sum is represented algebraically as 2ab. Going back to our first example, assume one of the
30 percent control firms merges with one of the 20 percent controllers. Then, 2(30)(20) = 1200,
which, since it represents the change in the HHI from the pre to the postmerger periods, must
be added to the premerger HHI of 2600. The Justice Department Guidelines state that mergers
with postmerger HHIls below 1000 usually will not be challenged, mergers that increase the
premerger HHI by 100 points or more in the 1000 to 1800 HHI range probably will be challenged,
and mergers that increase the premerger HHI by even 50 points in the over 1800 range likely
will be challenged.
BUT PLEASE NOTE: The author is not implying that these HHI ranges of the Justice
Department are also relevant in the commercial banking antitrust context. Given the nature
of the industry involved, the author believes that lower HHI numbers, perhaps significantly
so, could quantify anticompetitive markets.
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the plaintiffs across the aisle argue with equal vigor for the least
inclusive product market imaginable. As discussed above, the Supreme
Court, in Philadelphia National, has defined the relevant line-of-
commerce or product market for commercial bank acquisition and
merger cases as "commercial banking."' 7 3 Because the judicial defini-
tion of this term is narrow,'74 the product market must be defined
as relatively underinclusive. This means actual concentration ratios
in these cases are higher than they otherwise would be if the judicial
definition of "commercial banking" were to follow the broader
academic definitions. The result is that relatively few mergers and
acquisitions among affiliated and nonaffiliated commercial banks will
pass unscathed through the combined scrutinies of the Board, the
Justice Department, and the courts.
If the judicial definition is correct, then it serves to further the
clearly articulated command of Congress for antitrust law to stem
the rising tide of economic concentration, preferably during the early
stages of the problem. If, however, the judicial definition, still in vogue
after emerging over twenty-two years ago, is too restrictive, the ability
of affiliated commercial banks as well as nonaffiliated commercial
banks to compete successfully in financial markets against thrifts, credit
unions, nonbank banks, insurance companies, and other forms of
financial conglomerates, could be seriously impaired.
A cornerstone in the Philadelphia National definition of a com-
mercial bank was that commercial banks were "unique among finan-
cial institutions in that they alone are permitted by law to accept
demand deposits." 75 This "distinctive power" was critical, allowing
commercial banks to be a major source of credit and to be the
intermediaries in almost all financial transactions.' 76
If this is the judicial cornerstone, then the analytical structure in
the last seventeen years has crumbled. From 1945 to 1978, demand
deposits dropped from seventy-one percent to twenty-four percent of
the total deposits held in depository institutions. 17 With the ability
of thrifts to offer NOW accounts,' the downward spiral of com-
173. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963).
174. See supra notes 132-45 and accompanying text.
175. 374 U.S. at 326.
176. Id.
177. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Assets, Liabilities, and Capital Accounts,
Commercial and Mutual Savings Banks, December 31, 1945, 1960, and 1970.
178. Although a negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) account is not technically a demand
deposit, it is practically. A NOW account permits the depositor to write checks, and the reser-
vation clause allowing the savings and loan up to 30 days before it must honor the draft is
understood to be a sham. The judiciary should expand the rule of Whilshire Oil Co. v. Board
of Governors, 668 F.2d 732 (3d. Cir. 1981) and call such restricted accounts demand deposits,
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mercial bank depository holdings can only continue. 1"9
Moreover, the other mainstay of the restrictive judicial definition,
commercial lending, also is dated. In United States v. Connecticut
National Bank, the Comptroller argued that the judicial definition
was too restrictive,"' ° an argument that led him to approve a con-
solidation between two Connecticut banks. In upholding the consolida-
tion agreement against a Clayton Act challenge brought by the Justice
Department, the district court accepted the Comptroller's position that
thrifts and banks compete in a wide array of standard banking services,
including checking services and lending activities. In support, the court
said that Connecticut thrifts and other financial institutions exceeded
commercial banks in total number and volume of deposits.' 8'
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower court.8 2 The
Supreme Court admitted that banks and financial institutions, such
as thrifts, compete directly in the demand deposits market and in the
commercial financing field. The Court reasoned, however, that since
commercial lending by thrifts is generally of a short-term nature, and
is of distinctly lower volume than the amount of commercial lending
undertaken by commercial banks, then the line-of-commerce analysis
of Philadelphia National still applied.'83
In concluding, the Court interestingly seemed concerned with the
degree of actual market "overlap" between commercial banks and
thrifts.' 84 This perspective is novel to antitrust law. Nonbanking
antitrust cases, in defining product markets, universally have looked
to the actual and potential competition that exists between or among
arguably disparate products. This competition is measured through
the use of devices such as the cross-elasticity of demand; actual market
overlap never has been utilized as a product defining criterion.' 8 -
even when the restriction is due to state law. The courts, however, have refused to expand
Wilshire Oil. Rather, the case has been limited to time restrictions promulgated by the savings
and loan itself. See supra note 151.
179. 60 Fed. Res. Bull. 375 (1974).
180. 362 F. Supp. 240, 242 (D. Conn. 1973), vacated and remanded, 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
181. 362 F. Supp. at 246-49.
182. United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
183. Id. at 664-66. Considering "short term" business lending was a key aspect of commer-
cial banking to the Philadelphia National Court, the distinction drawn by the Court in Connec-
ticut National between commercial banks and thrifts is particularly unpersuasive. See supra
note 137 and accompanying text. That Connecticut thrifts account for only one-fifth of the
Connecticut commercial lending market is immaterial. The point is that they are in the market,
i.e., that they are competing.
184. 418 U.S. 656, 663 (1974).
185. Requiring actual market overlap could well gut antitrust enforcement, creating the most
restrictive product market definition possible beforehand. That is, rather than considering a
merger between a bank and a thrift that offer the same services in the same geographic area
as a merger between competitors (a horizontal merger), exact market overlap would require
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The "arty" antitrust analysis by the Supreme Court has forced many
commercial bankers, both those working for affiliated concerns as
well as those employed by nonaffiliated institutions,'86 to abandon their
merger plans. This has relegated them to the position of competitive
disadvantage in the commercial lending and depository gathering
markets,' 7 particularly in the commercial lending market, in which
size is a prerequisite to supply major business financing.' 8 Given the
noticeable shift of demand deposits formerly held by commercial banks
to those same and functionally identical deposits now held by other
financial institutions, the conclusion appears as self-evident that
commercial banks will be permitted to merge, and bank holding
companies will be allowed to acquire other commercial banks. Only
an updated reading of the critical product market, without a great
change in antitrust analysis, would be required.
In the lending and deposit taking markets, Congress has determined
that commercial banks alone are qualified to provide these services;
they must provide them by definition or not be considered a "com-
mercial bank." '89 Under the author's broadened product market
analysis, the current operational definition of commercial banking
would not be forced to undergo a major transplant or even serious
surgery. The lenient or expansive view of the definition of "bank"
in section 16 of Glass-Steagall already has academic and institutional
support from the Comptroller. Moreover, this definition has the back-
ing of financial reality. Furthermore, since "the business of banking"
encompasses the narrower term "commercial banking," the former
is a definitional ceiling while the latter is a definitional floor, a broader
reading of section 16 logically would entail a broader reading of sec-
tion 2(a)(1) of the BHCA. Even should the author's suggestion prove
meritorious, the antitrust analysis remains incomplete. The second issue
such a merger to be analyzed under the more lenient standard of conglomerate merger law
(a merger between noncompetitors). For a clear statement that overlap is not required in the
process of defining the proper product market, see e.g., 1982 Justice Department Merger
Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493 (1982); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325-26
(1962).
186. The reason for the identical antitrust treatment is that the BHCA antitrust standard
and the general antitrust law standard are identical.
187. For a detailed analysis of the historical and the practical implications of current
commercial bank merger law, see Friedlander and Slayton, Determination of the Relevant Pro-
duct Market in Bank Mergers: A Time for Reassessment?, 36 Bus. LAW. 1537 (1981); Austin,
The Evolution of Commercial Bank Merger Antitrust Law, 36 Bus. LAW. 297 (1981); Note,
Commercial Bank Mergers: The Case For Procedural and Substantive Deregulation, 95 HAv.
L. REv. 1914 (1982).
188. But cf. Rhoades, Are the Big Banks Big Enough?, 26 ANTITRusT BuLL. 315 (1981),
for the proposition that banks are big enough to supply the credit needs of their largest customers.
189. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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raised by Brown Shoe, the "section of the country," or geographic
market, awaits discussion.
2. The Geographic Market
In United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc.,' the Justice
Department challenged the proposed merger of two commercial banks
located in the State of Washington. The Department contended that,
among other relevant "section[s] of the country," the entire state
demarcated the geographic area in which these banks competed. 9 ,
In rejecting the contention of the Justice Department, the Supreme
Court identified the process of delimitating the relevant section of
the country for antitrust purposes. First, the Court stated that "section
of the country" and "relevant geographic market" has been treated
as identical.' 92 These synonymous concepts can be defined as "the
area in which the goods or services at issue are marketed to a signifi-
cant degree by the acquired firm."' 93 Should the acquired firm market
goods or services in more than one region, the Court will recognize
such distinct geographic markets.'9 A key limiting consideration, that
the Court was quick to add, however, was that the acquired firm
must be an actual, direct competitor in the purported geographic
market, even in a potential competition case.'19
Today large commercial banks market their services on literally a
world-wide scale. The well-publicized fear of imminent loan default
by such countries as Mexico, Argentina, and Poland would make this
statement axiomatic. Yet, the relevant geographic area of commercial
banking services continues to be controlled by Philadelphia National,
a twenty-two year old case.' 96
In Philadelphia National, the Court recognized the proposition that
the place where a commercial bank locates offices "does not delineate
with perfect accuracy an 'appropriate section of the country' in which
190. 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
191. Id. at 620.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 621.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 622. For an analysis of the "potential competition doctrine," see infra notes
208-16 and accompanying text. Note that the Court is incorrect in stating that antitrust law,
for purposes of geographic market definition, requires the acquired firm to be an actual com-
petitor in the market, even in a potential competition case. The Court actually has applied
this restrictive requirement only to the banking industry.
196. See, e.g., Wyoming Bancorporation v. Board of Governors, 729 F.2d 687, 689 (10th
Cir. 1984) (citing with approval the Philadelphia National method of determining the geographic
market).
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to appraise the effect of [a] merger on competition."'' 97 The Court
admitted that large borrowers and depositors, as well as those of an
intermediate size, "may find it practical to do a large part of their
banking business outside their home community."'' 9 Only the very
small borrowers and depositors were constrained to banks located
within their neighborhood.' 99 Despite this rational analysis, the Court
limited the relevant geographic market in Philadelphia National, a
market that included giant Philadelphia banks operating on national
and super-national scales, to the four contiguous counties of the
Philadelphia metropolitan area."'
Clearly, defining the proper geographic market narrowly has the
same effect as defining the relevant product market too restrictively.
Concentration ratios quantifying the actual degree of competitiveness
in the market will be skewed toward showing the market as less
competitive, perhaps artificially so. In this event, mergers and acquisi-
tions that might otherwise serve to foster competition by enabling
smaller concerns to combine and battle the Goliaths is doomed by
jaundiced judicial analysis.2 01
With the arguments already exposed in this article for departing
from the Philadelphia National analysis, a further one is presented
in the geographic market context. This is because of the convenience
of modern technologies. By placing a card into an automatic teller
machine, a depositor can accomplish all of his banking needs from
any location in the state. From a purely technological standpoint,
automatic teller banking could be done on a national scale.2 0 2 The
major affiliated commercial banks, therefore, directly compete in both
national and international financial markets. The Philadelphia National
geographic market analysis is not only dated, but is absurd. In order
to discover a rational and workable antitrust analysis for regulating
affiliated commercial bank acquisitions, a look at the types of com-
petition that occur in financial industries must be made.
197. 374 U.S. 321, 360 (1963).
198. Id. at 360.
199. With the EFTs, query if even this is still true. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
200. Id. at 361-62. The Court is unclear whether the relevant geographic market would
have even been that large, had not the State of Pennsylvania permitted branch banking into
contiguous counties.
201. The analysis is "jaundiced" in the sense of having a misapprehension of actual reality,
not in the sense of ill-begotten motive.
202. From a legal standpoint, the Douglas and McFadden Amendments would prohibit such
an undertaking. See 12 U.S.C. §§32 and 1842(d). For a discussion of some of the legal problems
that would be raised by such a sharing of the electronic funds transfer system, see Goldberg,
Shared Electronic Funds Transfer Systems: Some Legal Implications, 98 BANNG L.J. 715 (1981).
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3. The Types of Competition
In bank merger and acquisition disputes, antitrust law delimits the
types of possible competition into two broad categories, actual
competition and perceived potential competition. 23 The latter category
is further divided into the product extension and market extension
branches.204 Under the author's broadened view of the proper affiliated
commercial bank antitrust analysis, each category is applicable.
a. Actual competition
As we have seen, current antitrust analysis with respect to the bank-
ing industry requires that an acquired bank be an actual, direct
competitor within the market under consideration.2 0 Otherwise, the
relevant geographic market is construed too broadly.
With respect to the area of competition, the author adheres to
current antitrust methodology. Actual competition within a given
geographic region will be taken into account for purposes of quanti-
fying market concentration.2 6 Likewise, no methodological change
would occur in defining the proper product market. The author's
analysis would merely take into account those financial institutions
that compete head-to-head with commercial banks in amassing and
distributing liquidity to finance industrial and other forms of
commercial ventures. Thus, the methodological approach of current
antitrust analysis, with respect to actual competition, would remain
the same. Analytically, the courts and the Justice Department should
be well-equipped to update their analysis without difficulty.
Every successful antitrust action in the banking field has been based
solely on the theory of actual competition.2 7 Under the author's
theory, however, two additional antitrust doctrines also would be used.
The first of these is perceived potential competition, the product ex-
tension branch.
b. Perceived potential competition: product extension branch
In Federal Trade Commission v. Proctor and Gamble Company, °8
203. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 626-27 (1974).
204. Id. at 624 (market extension); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Proctor and Gamble, 386
U.S. 568, 573-74 (1967) (product extension).
205. See supra note 195.
206. The author's suggestions would require broader definitions of the proper geographic
market(s). Yet the method of analysis for "section of the country" would not change; rather,
the method would be applied to 1985, not to 1963.
207. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 627 (1964) ("[all] the Court's
prior bank merger cases have involved combinations between actual competitors").
208. 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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the Supreme Court reversed a ruling by the lower court that an
acquisition by Proctor and Gamble of the Chlorox Chemical Com-
pany, the leading manufacturer of household liquid bleach, did not
violate the antitrust laws because Proctor and Gamble did not market
an independent brand of bleach. In justifying reversal, the Court
reasoned that because Proctor and Gamble was the dominant firm'
in the national soap, detergent, and cleanser markets, the firm would
need to take but a short step to enter the bleach market de novo
or through a toehold acquisition.2"9 Such a move was a logical parallel
of other "product extension" undertakings previously accomplished
by the conglomerate. As a result, other firms in the bleach industry
most likely had considered the probable moves of the giant firm when
setting their marketing and pricing strategies. In effect, Proctor and
Gamble, through the marketing of related household products, was
positioned physically in the same geographic market with the bleach
firms. Consequently, it was a potential competitor, perceived by the
bleach firms as capable of entering the bleach market at will. This
led the Court to conclude that the proposed merger substantially could
lessen competition in the household liquid bleach market."'
The Proctor and Gamble doctrine would have applicability under
the author's broadened antitrust banking analysis. Many financial
institutions compete directly in those areas that this article has defined
as encompassing "the business of banking" and "commercial
banking." For example, an acquisition by a bank holding company
of a mortgage company, consumer finance bank, industrial bank, or
some other nonbank bank, 211 could raise antitrust considerations,
should evidence show a possibility that the affiliate bank was preceived
as a likely competitor in a given geographic market wherein both
the affiliated commercial bank and the to-be-acquired nonbank bank
competed. To require actual and direct competition, as the courts
currently do, is a de facto exemption from an important segment of
the antitrust laws, 212 and further serves to adulterate actual concen-
tration ratios by narrowing the operative markets solely to overlap-
ping competition. These same criticisms apply to the final form of
competition that this article will consider, that of perceived potential
competition, market extension branch.
209. Id. at 573-74. A "toehold" acquisition is an acquisition of a firm with an insignificant
market share in its industry.
210. Id. at 578.
211. This reference is to acquisitions that are permissible without prior Board approval.
See 12 C.F.R. §225.22(c)(8).
212. Congress intends antitrust laws to have uniform application, and the courts have expressly
recognized this. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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c. Perceived potential competition: market extension branch
Like the perceived product entrant, the mere presence of the
perceived market entrant in the periphery affects the marketing and
pricing decisions of other firms in a defined market. In the latter
case, however, the perceived market competitor already produces the
good or provides the service that encompasses the product market.
Rather, such a potential competitor does not operate directly within
the geographic market under consideration-although those firms
operating within that geographic market fear that the outside firm
can enter at will. This theory of competition was given antitrust ef-
fect by the Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Falstaff
Brewing Corporation.21 3 In Falstaff, the Court held, in determining
whether the Falstaff Brewing Company could enter the New England
brewery market through acquisition of the largest beer retailer in the
region, that the primary factor to consider was whether the mere
presence of Falstaff on the fringes of the market was "likely to exer-
cise substantial influence on [the] market behavior" of the brewing
firms already in the market. 21
In the affiliated commercial banking context, the utility of this
competitive theory is open to question, given the restrictions of the
Douglas Amendment. 215 This amendment, however, is not as restric-
tive with respect to geographic market determination for antitrust pur-
poses as the language might seem. The amendment, for instance, does
not prohibit bank holding companies from acquiring "closely related"
nonbanking financial institutions across state lines. Acquisitions by
bank holding companies of such nonbank banks are increasingly com-
mon. Under the broadened analysis proposed by the author, antitrust
issues would be implicated despite the facial restrictions of the Douglas
Amendment.
Moreover, most of the largest nationally-chartered commercial banks
are affiliated with a holding company. With an anticipated relaxa-
tion by the Comptroller of some interstate banking restrictions,
combined with modern technological feasibilities, banks in polar
sections of the nation will be forced to respond to increased poten-
tial, and actual, competition. The antitrust tools of Philadelphia
National and Marine Bancorporation are incapable of working with
these new materials. Using the antitrust tools that the author suggests,
213. 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
214. Id. at 532.
215. 12 U.S.C. §1842(d) (prohibiting national bank acquisitions of out-of-state banks, unless
the state wherein the national bank is located permits local banks to acquire out-of-state banks).
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however, should serve to build a workable structure of competitive
analysis for the banking industry. At the very least, the author's alter-
native is more in tune with congressional demand that antitrust analysis
be applied uniformly. This alternative additionally is consistent with
the quantitative data showing a marked degree of competitive overlap
between banks and other financial institutions.
CONCLUSION
The dual trends affecting affiliated commercial banks are equally
disturbing. On the one hand, increased involvement in the investments
industry portends financial dislocation. On the other hand, continued
quarantine from related financial markets promises economic misalloca-
tion. Reassessment of the relationship between the Glass-Steagall and
Bank Holding Company Acts, plus an updated analysis of the antitrust
statutes, are the defenses required to defeat these potential disasters.
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